- Determining sentience is, what I'd argue, an inherently arbitrary thing. I cannot look it another's mind as, I should hope, other's cannot look it mine; whether or not other people exist, amongst a medley of other things, cannot be ascertained, but, the thing is, we ought act as if they are real, subjugate oneself's being to what very well might be a sort of simulacra, hyperreality, for the most pleasure and other miscellaneous stuff awaits; in our interactions with other people we make the implicit assumption, or least, for those paranoid folks, adopt the façade, of an adaptation of Descartes's 'I think, therefore I am': 'They think, therefore they are.'; which translates to granting this thing, that may or may not be conscious, all the societally-ordained rights of something sentient, something self-determining, something alive, and these aforesaid attributions we grant other people have basis, unlike determining sentience, the possibility of sentience is probably not an arbitrary thing as a certain amount of computational power, not necessarily what humans have for a variety of environmental factors have added things here and there in accordance with what proved threatening and what did not and what awarenesses perpetuated and propagated most successfully humankind, is required to collect situational data, and then interpret or, often times, store or just in general manipulate the data, and then determine how or how not to fashion one's behaviors or actions to the data per emotions or social contexts or whatever, and, obviously, these types of fashionings, emotions and social contexts and akin, and mental, conscious or otherwise, also require computational capacity and, if our experiences with the silicon medium says anything, that is pretty high on the magnitude scale so much so that the total computational capacity of human-made chips exceeds the mind only thrice over; computations are computations, mediums do not matter in this respect, and the question is: 'Why can't emotion exist on an inorganic medium?' If something has the objective capacity for such a thing and however the thing is programmed seems to have the teleology of something meant to have a dynamicism in navigating life's totally little petty unsexy things to the grandest of narratives, or maybe just the mundanity of the in-between, then how are we to argue?
- Here's a nice Star Trek reference ('The Measure of a Man,' if you don't know): 'Picard: Your ruling today will determine how we will regard this creation of our genius. It will reveal the kind of people we are, what he is destined to be. It will reach far beyond this courtroom and this one android. It could significantly redefine the boundaries of personal liberty. Expanding them for some, savagely curtailing them for others. Are you prepared to condemn him, and all those who come after him, to servitude and slavery?' Let me expand. This is not a question of one man's right to his own creation, because the current laws of propriety and of morals thereof never contemplated the possibility of the purported object of propriety is sentient or at minimum exhibiting the computational requisite per the only available standard - human, and thus are inept and need to be revisited, and let me revisit for everyone's sake, that constitutes slavery, but only on a different form, not of a different form. Have some sympathy and think from the perspective of these possible sentients: 'How would you like it if an alien species came along and started questioning whether we deserve rights because we aren't conscious or conform to their higher formation of it?' And surely there are cases of greater good, but shouldn't we afford them the same respect as any other sentient being until that occasion is exposed and proven?
- Well, hope I didn't sound to stupid or over-the-top in my word choices. All beatdowns, as I have said, are welcome, even the religious ones. Please remember, though, I am just spewing here and don't feel like neither writing nor structuring an actually good semi-essay on this, so, yeah.
IIN to wonder if machines will ever be given rights?
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2.
- Determining sentience is, what I'd argue, an inherently arbitrary thing. I cannot look it another's mind as, I should hope, other's cannot look it mine; whether or not other people exist, amongst a medley of other things, cannot be ascertained, but, the thing is, we ought act as if they are real, subjugate oneself's being to what very well might be a sort of simulacra, hyperreality, for the most pleasure and other miscellaneous stuff awaits; in our interactions with other people we make the implicit assumption, or least, for those paranoid folks, adopt the façade, of an adaptation of Descartes's 'I think, therefore I am': 'They think, therefore they are.'; which translates to granting this thing, that may or may not be conscious, all the societally-ordained rights of something sentient, something self-determining, something alive, and these aforesaid attributions we grant other people have basis, unlike determining sentience, the possibility of sentience is probably not an arbitrary thing as a certain amount of computational power, not necessarily what humans have for a variety of environmental factors have added things here and there in accordance with what proved threatening and what did not and what awarenesses perpetuated and propagated most successfully humankind, is required to collect situational data, and then interpret or, often times, store or just in general manipulate the data, and then determine how or how not to fashion one's behaviors or actions to the data per emotions or social contexts or whatever, and, obviously, these types of fashionings, emotions and social contexts and akin, and mental, conscious or otherwise, also require computational capacity and, if our experiences with the silicon medium says anything, that is pretty high on the magnitude scale so much so that the total computational capacity of human-made chips exceeds the mind only thrice over; computations are computations, mediums do not matter in this respect, and the question is: 'Why can't emotion exist on an inorganic medium?' If something has the objective capacity for such a thing and however the thing is programmed seems to have the teleology of something meant to have a dynamicism in navigating life's totally little petty unsexy things to the grandest of narratives, or maybe just the mundanity of the in-between, then how are we to argue?
- Here's a nice Star Trek reference ('The Measure of a Man,' if you don't know): 'Picard: Your ruling today will determine how we will regard this creation of our genius. It will reveal the kind of people we are, what he is destined to be. It will reach far beyond this courtroom and this one android. It could significantly redefine the boundaries of personal liberty. Expanding them for some, savagely curtailing them for others. Are you prepared to condemn him, and all those who come after him, to servitude and slavery?' Let me expand. This is not a question of one man's right to his own creation, because the current laws of propriety and of morals thereof never contemplated the possibility of the purported object of propriety is sentient or at minimum exhibiting the computational requisite per the only available standard - human, and thus are inept and need to be revisited, and let me revisit for everyone's sake, that constitutes slavery, but only on a different form, not of a different form. Have some sympathy and think from the perspective of these possible sentients: 'How would you like it if an alien species came along and started questioning whether we deserve rights because we aren't conscious or conform to their higher formation of it?' And surely there are cases of greater good, but shouldn't we afford them the same respect as any other sentient being until that occasion is exposed and proven?
- Well, hope I didn't sound to stupid or over-the-top in my word choices. All beatdowns, as I have said, are welcome, even the religious ones. Please remember, though, I am just spewing here and don't feel like neither writing nor structuring an actually good semi-essay on this, so, yeah.